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Dewey, Second Nature, Social
Criticism, and the Hegelian Heritage
Italo Testa
1 The  expression  “second  nature”  is  used  a  significant  number  of  times  by  Dewey
throughout his philosophical career, since the early The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus (1897)
up  to  Freedom  and  Culture (1939)  and  later  writings,  and  mostly  related  to  the
commonplace saying that  “habit  is  second nature.”1 As  such,  the expression “second
nature” is used by Dewey in a predicative sense, to qualify something as something – even
though some uses as a noun expression are to be found in his works.2 And that which is so
characterized is not a marginal feature but rather a core notion – habit – of both his
theory of knowledge and action.  It  is  not by chance that the first occurrence of this
expression takes place in 1897, the same year in which Dewey lectured at the University
of Chicago on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. In this course Dewey dealt intensively
with the “Anthropology” section of  the “Encyclopedia”3 and gave a central  role in his
reading of Spirit to the notion of “habit” developed in §410: the paragraph where Hegel
explicitly writes that “habit has been rightly called a second nature (Die Gewohnheit ist mit
Recht eine zweite Natur genannt worden).”4 Even though Hegel is never directly quoted by
Dewey whenever he refers to second nature, a stark Hegelian imprinting, as we’ll see, is
to be found both in his understanding of habit and of second nature.
 
I. Dewey’s Understanding of Habit and its Hegelian
Background
2 Constitutive role. The starting point for this consideration is to realize that habit is the
basic notion of Dewey’s understanding of social reality and that according to him it plays
a constitutive role for human life forms both in a structural and in a genetic sense. That’s
what Dewey expresses in Human Nature and Conduct with the anthropological theorem
that “Man is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct.”5 Dewey insists on the
decisive role that habit formation plays for the constitution of human social facts. As
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Dewey argues  in  Human  Nature and  Conduct, social  reality  is  dependent  upon human
interaction, which has the form of conjoint action. And habit is the fundamental socio-
ontological notion necessary in order to understand what conjoint action is, since human
action is always action that happens in the context of prior action. Habit is thus defined
as “the kind of human activity which is influenced by prior action and in that sense
acquired.”6 As Dewey writes in The Public and Its Problems, 
habit is the mainspring of human action, and habits are formed for the most part
under  the  influence  of  the  customs  of  a  group.  […]  The  dependence  of  habit-
forming  upon  those  habits  of a  group  which  constitutes  customs  is  a  natural
consequence of the helplessness of infancy.7 
3 Such an understanding of habit is naturalistically rooted. Habituation is a life process,
which concerns the way our natural life form is made, interacts with its environment and
reproduces itself. The formation of habits is built into our organic nature and is sensitive
to  the  affordances  of  natural  environment,  but  still  acquired  as  a  result  of  a  social
learning process, since the heart of learning is exactly the “creation of habitudes.”8
4 Objectivity of Habits. The process of habit formation does not concern only individuals and
their  subjective  dispositions,  but  involves  also  the  shaping of  the  natural  and social
objective world. First, habits are connected with a double sense of embodiment: they are
embodied  in  corporeal  attitudes  of  the  subjects  of  habit  formation,  and  incorporate
objective forces,  since they are sensitive to the affordances of  the natural  and social
environment we inhabit and the social environment we inherit. But such an embodiment
is  not  merely  an  adjustment  to  the  natural  and  social  environment,  but  also  an
adjustment of the social environment, which is thus reshaped by the process of habit
formation and in its turn embodies it.9 
5 Moreover, habit formation for Dewey has three sides: “habits” properly said, by which he
means  established  patterns  of  action  of  individuals;  “customs,”  by  which  he  means
established collective patterns of action; and “institutions,” understood as systematized
established  social  arrangements  of  habits.10 In  this  sense,  Dewey’s  notion  of  habit
corresponds both to what I have elsewhere named “subjective,” “internal second nature,”
and the notions of custom and institution correspond to that of “objective,” “external
second nature.”11 The process of habit formation, understood as a process that leads us
from our first biological nature to our second nature (our cultural nature), is a process in
which these two sides are strictly intertwined. On the one hand, according to Dewey
habits are formed for the most part under the influence of the customs, which means that
the objective side has some sort of priority in this process.12 But on the other hand, this
prominence of custom, does not mean that the subjective side of habit does not continue
to  have  a  deep  role,  especially  for  what  concerns  its  dialectical  relation  with  (first)
organic nature, that which Dewey in this context names “impulse.”
6 If we understand it this way, Dewey’s affirmation in Human Nature and Conduct that “man
is a creature of habit” can be appreciated as an original and systematic reconstruction of
Hegel’s  thesis,  expressed in the Encyclopedia,  of  the universal  anthropological  role  of
habit, which “embraces all kinds and stages of mind’s activity (umfaßt alle Arten und Stufen
der Tätigkeit des Geistes).”13 The naturalistic side of this Hegelian position is more radical
for Dewey, but significantly emerges from his interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of
subjective spirit.14 Secondly, Dewey traces in a more systematic way a distinction between
habits, customs, and institutions, which recaptures the objective side that for Hegel too
the  notion  of  habits  played  –  applying  both  to  individual  abilities  and  activities  –
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subjective spirit – and to the social objective world – objective spirit. In this way Dewey
regains  in  a  theoretical  way  the  socio-ontological  role  that  “custom”  plays  for  the
constitution of Sittlichkeit in §§ 4 and 151 of the Grundlinien. 
7 Critical and dialectical dimension.15 The notion of habit for Dewey is not just an affirmative
and descriptive  one,  concerning an accomplished positive  state,  but  rather  a  critical
dispositive  which  should  allow  the  critical  re-description  of  processes  of  critical
transformation and growth. As for Hegel, habit is taken by Dewey as a manifestation of
the  “will.”16 In  his  Philosophy  of  Right  Hegel  conceives  of  habit  qua  custom  as  an
embodiment of the will which moulds the bodiliness of the “first,” “purely natural will”17
into  a  “second  nature.”  This  relation  between  “natural  will”  and  second  nature  is
reconstructed  by  Dewey  into  the  relation  between  “impulse”  –  which  is  by  him
understood as “original,” “native” will – and “habit.” Dewey constructs such a relation in
a strong dialectical way. On the one hand, the notion of habit as manifestation of the will
–  understood as an embodied pattern of  action,  that is  action which happens in the
context of prior action – presupposes that of “impulse,” taken as original, native activity/
will. But impulses are not to be understood as having a given, fixed content, independent
from the way in which they dialectically relate to habits. As Dewey writes, “the meaning
of  native  activities  is  not  native;  it  is  acquired.  It  depends  upon  interaction  with  a
matured social medium.”18 This does not mean that the notion of impulse is completely
absorbed into and reducible to that of habit, since a dialectical relation to the naturalness
of impulses is still needed in order to capture the dynamic structure of habits. As such,
impulses,  understood as  not  yet  determined and organized activity,  play  the  role  of
“agency  of  deviation,”  “pivots  of  readjustment,”19 grasping  the  open,  unpredictable
character of every action. The notion of impulse expresses the fact that every action is in
some  sense  a  unique  one,20 which  happens  anew  and  involves  an  unpredictable
readjustment of previous experience: as Dewey writes, “all action is an invasion of the
future, of the unknown. Conflict and uncertainty are ultimate traits.”21
8 In this sense the notion of habit is not just a descriptive, static notion, concerning the
structural  features  of  social  action  in  a  synchronic  sense,  but  it  is  also  critical  and
dynamic too, since, in its dialectical relation to impulses, it is also used to account for
habit formation as a diachronic process that involves variation and change, and in whose
development  plurality  and  conflict  are  immanent.22 Hegel’s  understanding  of  spirit’s
activity as a process of habit formation rather than as total habituation (which for Hegel
would  correspond  rather  to  loss  of  vitality  and  eventually  “death”23),  is  here  made
explicit by Dewey and reconstructed in a radically pluralist way through the articulation
of the internal relation of habit to impulse.
9 A further point concerning the critical dimension of the notion of habit regards the way
the process of habit formation is interpreted by Dewey as a process of liberation which
expresses a dialectical tension between freedom and un-freedom, disempowerment and
empowerment. Such a dialectical tension is reflected within the very notion of habit.
That’s why Dewey repeatedly distinguishes between ‘bad’ and ‘good,’ ‘dead’ and ‘living’
habits, ‘routine’ and ‘intelligent’ habits. In their process of formation habits can manifest
both  aspects.  On  the  one  hand,  the  establishment  of  habitual  patterns  is  a  form of
empowerment insofar as it can free us from previous limited and oppressive situations
and lead to the development of novel capacities and courses of possible action. But on the
other hand,  these same habits  can turn into repetitive,  inertial  patterns of  behavior
which block the expansion of life’s forces.24 
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10 Such  a  dialectic  notion  of  habit  is  at  the  basis  of  the  social  notion  of  freedom  as
emancipation  which  Dewey  develops  also  in  socio-philosophical  writings  such  as
Liberalism and Social Action.25 Human freedom has to be understood as an ongoing process
of liberation, which has an iterative structure, since the habits which secure freedom’s
expressive expansion as the result of a process of emancipation from previous natural
and  social  constraints,  can  always  transform  themselves  into  inertial  patterns,
engendering the need to be liberated from their oppressive, life’s and meaning’s blocking
structure.
11 This dialectics of habit formation has again a footing in Dewey’s reading of Hegel. Already
a passage from his early (1887) Psychology affirms the enabling and freeing role of habit in
a way pretty close to Hegel’s formulation in § 410 of the Encyclopedia,26 to which Dewey
himself will again give an important role in his 1897 Lectures on Spirit.27 The idea that habit
in itself is not identical neither to freedom nor to enslavement to repetition, but is rather
a dialectical process, can be traced back to the passage where Hegel writes that “by habit
a man becomes free, yet, on the other hand, habit makes him its slave (der Mensch durch
die Gewohnheit einerseits frei wird, so macht ihn dieselbe doch andererseits zu ihrem Sklaven).”28
Moreover,  such  a  dialectics  of  relative  freedom  and  relative  un-freedom  is  also
understood  by  Hegel  as  a  process  of  “Liberation  (Brefreiung)”29 which  involves  a
distinction between “bad habits (üblen Gewohnheiten)” (inertial, enslaving) and good ones
(expansive,  expressive  of  life’s  freedom) meaning that habit  is  not  in  itself  identical
neither with enslaving repetition nor with freedom, but can be expressive of both in
different contexts or under different aspects.
12 Automatic Structure of Habit. This leads us directly to the question of “second nature.” In
fact,  the  passages  where  Hegel  in  the  Encyclopedia  articulates  this  dialectics  between
freedom and un-freedom is immediately followed by the passage where Hegel explicitly
qualifies habit as “second nature”:
Die Gewohnheit ist mit Recht eine zweite Natur genannt worden, – Natur, denn sie
ist ein unmittelbares Sein der Seele, – eine zweite, denn sie ist eine von der Seele
gesetzte Unmittelbarkeit.30
13 Here  it  is  important  to  note  that  this  notion  of  habit  as  second  nature  is  strictly
connected with the understanding of habit as a “mechanism of self-feeling (Mechanismus
des Selbstgefühls).”31 As Hegel writes in the same paragraph, habit is the “determinacy of
the  feeling  […]  made  into  something  that  is  natural,  mechanical  (die  zu  einem
Natürlichseienden,  Mechanischen  gemachte  Bestimmtheit  des  Gefühls),”32 where  it  is  the
activity of the spirit which gives to it “the shape of something mechanical, of a merely 
natural effect (die Gestalt eines Mechanischen,  einer bloßen Naturwirkung).”33 And please
note that here the mechanical side of habit is not per se negatively qualified, since for
Hegel it is a necessary aspect of the functioning of spiritual life in all its forms and levels –
including intentional, reflexive and free ones – that “the voluntary embodiments of the
mental discussed here become through habit something mechanical (die hier besprochenen
freiwilligen Verleiblichungen des Geistigen durch Gewohnheit zu etwas Mechanischem).”34
14 The mechanism of habit – the fact that habit has to function as something automatic,
embodied in preintentional physiological mechanisms, and operates at a prereflexive,
unconscious  level  –  is  thus  a  sliding  door,  since  it  can  be  the  natural  basis  of  the
expression  of  spiritual  freedom –  a  necessary,  even if  not  sufficient  condition  of  it,
expressed by the idea that habit “has the content of freedom” – but can also implement
an enslaving pattern and thus take the form of un-freedom. Which means that neither
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freedom nor un-freedom are identical with habitual mechanism. As we’ll see, Dewey, who
already in his early Psychology insisted on the automatism of habitual action, and who in
the Lectures on Psychology quoted the passage on the “mechanism of self-feeling,” will give
a central role to the mechanical structure of habit, positing it at the core of his account of
life’s processes and of his understanding of second nature.
 
II. Dewey’s Uses of Second Nature
15 Let’s now come to analyze the way Dewey explicitly uses the expression “second nature”
in his works. How does second nature qualify habit when it is used by Dewey in this way?
16 Constitutive role.  First, already in Dewey’s early writings, “second nature” is connected
with the constitutive role habits play for the human associated form of life. As Dewey
writes in the syllabus A Study of Ethics, “habits, second nature, give us consistency and
force.”35 Here  second  nature  understands  the  fact  that  habits  constitute  a  deep
ontological structure which cements the way of being of human life forms. For this reason
Dewey very often quotes the saying that habit is second nature to underline the strength,
potency,  persistency  and urgency,  and even authority  of  habitual  action patterns  in
human interaction. It is here that the relation between the notions of first and second
nature frequently comes up. “Habit is second, if not first nature,” writes Dewey in his
1908 Ethics.36 In Freedom and Culture habit as second nature is said to be not only “as potent
and as urgent as first nature,”37 so deeply engrained to “have all the inevitability that
belongs to the movements of the fixed stars.”38 What is more, Dewey writes that “second
or acquired nature is stronger than first nature.”39 All these passages are echoing in a
close manner a topos to be found in Hegel’s Grundlinien, where Sittlichkeit is qualified as
second nature insofar as it “takes the place of the first and purely natural will,”40 and
where, in the preceding paragraphs, the “absolute power and authority” of the ethical
laws is said to be “infinitely higher,” “infinitely more firmly based than the being of
nature  (eine  absolute,  unendlich  festere  Autorität  und  Macht,  als  das  Sein  der  Natur),”41
exemplified here by the sun and the moon and their physical laws.
17 Automatism. The potency and urgency of habit is furthermore captured by its qualification
as second nature because the latter comprehends exactly the fact that habit has a grip on
us insofar as it takes the form of a mechanism which operates at a natural level, being
rooted  in  our  physiological  structure,  functionally  implemented  in  subpersonal
mechanisms,  and phenomenologically  expressed in a  pre-reflexive dimension.  This  is
what Dewey for instance expresses when he writes that “all these things, which are habits
with us, which are automatic, which have become second nature, have to be acquired by
the child.”42
18 Objectivity  of  Second  Nature.  A  further  point  to  underline  here  is  that  second  nature
according to Dewey involves an objective dimension. Dewey uses the expression “second
nature” to refer to instances of individual subjective corporeal dispositions and activities
such as the upright posture and the activity of walking,43 thinking dispositions such as
logical  skills44 and  “habits  of  opinion.” 45 But  he  uses  second  nature  also,  and  in  a
paradigmatic sense given the socio-ontological priority of custom over individual habit,
to  refer,  as  seen,  to  shared  customs,46 socially  accustomed prejudices  such  as  racist
attitudes47, rituals and etiquette,48 and institutional forms of life.
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19 Critical and Dialectical Dimensions. The notion of second nature is double edged in Dewey’s
use. As seen, Dewey on the one hand uses it to qualify the automatic, mechanical, pre-
intentional and pre-reflexive structure of habitual disposition. Moreover, second nature
qualifies  the  persistency  of  character  of  habits  and  their  persistent  grip  over  us.
Furthermore,  the expression is used also,  with a negative connotation,  to qualify the
“inertial” moment of habits,49 that is the fact that the automatic mechanism can turn into
patterns where habits perpetuate themselves in a repetitive, rigid, reifying way. 
20 But on the other hand, second nature is used also to qualify “reflection as “arrested
habits”50 or else to say that “habits of reflection,” which manifest varying, flexible and
living attitudes, are “as easy and natural as organic appetites.”51 Here, “second nature”
qualifies the strength of habits which manifest themselves in a varying, flexible and living
manner.  And  in  How  We  Think,  such  a  notion  of  second  nature  is  connected  with
“conscious and deliberate skills in thinking,”52 which are then to be interpreted as modes
of habit that can manifest themselves in varying, flexible and living attitudes. 
21 The relation between these two sides of habit as second nature is by no means external,
but is rather an internal one. The inertial moment is not to be misunderstood as identical
with the ontological strength of habits and their automaticity – since even not inertial
habits, that is flexible ones, have to be instantiated in an automatic and persistent way in
order to work properly. Still, the inertial momentum relies on and can profit from the
same mechanism that implements good habits, including reflective ones. On the other
hand, even reflective habits are not per se prevented from turning into inertial patterns.
For instance, Dewey observes in The Public and its Problems that “habits of opinion” are
“the toughest of all habits; when they have become second nature and are supposedly
thrown out of the door, they creep in again as stealthily and surely as does first nature.”53
22 More  generally,  the  ambivalence  of  second nature  is  here  analyzed  in  terms  of  the
dialectics  between first  and second nature.  When Dewey wrote  that  habit  as  second
nature is as potent, as urgent as first nature, or even stronger, we were confronted with a
dialectical exchange, when one term turns into its opposite. Here, what Adorno would
have called the “appearance of necessity” of second nature, and Dewey in Contrary to
human nature labels as the “confusion of second or acquired nature with original nature,”54
is much more than a cognitive error. Since such an appearance manifests an objective
dialectical inversion which suspends the rigid opposition between the given sense which
opposes first nature as original, fixed and not modifiable and second nature as acquired,
variant and modifiable by human action. In the end, second nature manifests itself as
more persistent than what appears to be the case at first, and first nature manifests itself
as more variable and modifiable than what appears as second. As Dewey writes in the
article Human Nature, 
the acquired nature may moreover become so deeply engrained as to be for all
intents and purposes native, a fact recognized in the common saying that habit is a
second  nature.  And  on  the  other  hand,  taking  a  long  biological  evolution  into
account, that which is now given and original is the outcome of long processes of
long growth.55 
23 Here  the  critical  use  of  the  notion  of  second  nature  is,  in  comparison  with  Hegel,
accentuated,  and  the  dialectics  between  first  and  second  nature  more  insistently
articulated  and  demarcated  by  a  Darwinian  flavor  that  nevertheless  works  as  a
reinforcement of a dialectical dispositive within some form of social naturalism rather
than as a foundational device of a reductionist type.
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24 The “paradoxical” inversion between second and first nature takes us back to Dewey’s
analysis  of  the  relation  between  habits  and  impulses.  The  latter  are  at  first  sight
characterized  as  “primitive,”  “native”  and “inevitable”  activities,  whereas  habits  are
understood as “secondary,” “not original,” “acquired,” which implicitly corresponds to a
distinction between first and second nature.56 But as Dewey observes, when we consider
this distinction in relation to human conduct, it turns out that habits manifest themselves
as primitive, whereas impulses acquire their meaning and define their content in relation
to  them,  and  are  as  such  secondary  and  derived  (“in  short,  the  meaning  of  native
activities is not native, is acquired”).57 Moreover, in the evolution of habit formation the
apparent first nature of native activities manifests itself as a dynamic factor – impulses
function as not yet organized activities which introduce elements of variation, deviation
from old routes – whereas acquired patterns which appear as second nature are much
less permeable to change and may operate as inertial factors.
 
III. Art and Routine
25 An Expressive Model of Habit. I would now like to show that at the core of this critical and
dialectical interpretation of second nature lies an expressive model. Once again, Dewey’s
reading of Hegel’s Anthropology seems to offer here a convenient point of departure. In
fact, while reconstructing the three moments of habit distinguished by Hegel – hardening
against  external  sensations,  indifference  towards  satisfaction,  and  dexterity
(Geschicklichkeit) – Dewey already put a strong emphasis in his Lectures on Spirit on the
third moment, which is the culminating one and that for Hegel is characterized in terms
of  an  expressive  embodiment,  where  bodiliness  is  taken  into  possession  and  one
“becomes more and more at home in its expressions in ihren Äußerungen somit immer
heimischer wird.”58 Here Dewey uses the notions of “power” and “skill” to reconstruct this
active  form  of  habit.  Through  habit,  then,  human  beings  come  to  possess  their
experience. They acquire “an additional power,”59 that is, they are empowered in their
acting capacities. 
26 This idea that the culminating moment of habit  formation can involve an expressive
appropriation is, according to the interpretation I am presenting here, a peculiar trait of
Dewey’s approach to second nature. If we realize this, then we can start to appreciate why
Dewey does not oppose habituation and meaningful expression, or in other terms why the
ethical model of second nature based on habituation is for him dialectically connected
with the aesthetic model of second nature based on art.60 In the common sense, and for
many philosophical authors of the 20th century, the notion of habit tends to be reduced
to a negative meaning where it is identical with routine, bare repetition, and tends to be
opposed to  the  active  notion of  skill  –  as  it  happens,  for  instance,  in  the  analytical
tradition, by Ryle, who opposes habits to skill, but also, in the dialectical tradition, by
Lukács, who tends to use the notion of second nature as a negative one.61 Whereas it is a
peculiar feature of Dewey’s position that here skills are understood as an accomplishment
of habit, and hence habit, and second nature, can both have a negative and a positive
sense, being compatible with an expressive dimension that involves plasticity, flexibility,
and creativity.62 Expressive  accomplishment  is  a  possible  perfected outcome of  habit
formation, which is by no means guaranteed and does not prevent habits from falling
back into rigid patterns. Still, the possibility of expressive appropriation is what makes
the difference here in Dewey’s model.
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27 It’s Dewey’s expressive notion of habit which accounts for his strong rejection of the
identification of  the latter  with repetition.  Repetition and exercise  are  a  mechanism
through which habits can be acquired and consolidated but do not define their essence.
As Dewey argues, “habit is in no sense the essence of habit. Tendency to repeat acts is an
incident of many habits but not of all.”63 For instance, a murderous attack may happen
only once in a lifetime but still be due to habit for someone who has the disposition to
give way to anger. On this basis, Dewey argues against those who assume “from the start
the identity of habit with routine,” and thinks rather that the most fundamental feature
of habit, their essence in the Hegelian sense of the concept to which they correspond and
that they can instantiate at different degrees of accomplishment, consist in the fact that
“habit is an ability, an art formed by past experience.”64 These abilities are per se no more
conservative than they are progressive, but everything depends on their quality, which
takes  us  back  to  the  distinction  between  “bad”  and  “good”  habits,  the  latter  being
understood as qualitative enhancement of the very structure of habit.65
28 It is exactly here that the distinction between routine and art plays a decisive role for the
way Dewey articulates the distinction between two qualitatively different modes of habit
expression, that is “routine habits” on the one hand, and what he calls “intelligent,”
“creative” habits.
29 Here, on the one hand, the positive notion of habit is characterized as something sensible
to practice and exercise, both self-preserving and self-transforming, freely intertwining
with other habits, flexible and adjustable to different situations. And capable of creative
answers – the aesthetic model of the free play of faculties is somehow in the background –
that fit the unusual and the novel by producing new meanings that are “unique” and
“never twice alike,”66 thus empowering life’s evaluative manifestation and introducing
within it elements of deviation and variation. Whereas, routine habits are seen as habits
that “apply only where conditions remain the same or recur in uniform ways.”67 They are
qualified as “rigid” responses, pigeon-hole like rather than intertwining, overspecialized,
based on previous patterns that merely self-perpetuate without transforming themselves.
They are incapable of adapting themselves to varying situations and are incapable of
renewing themselves, but rather tend to decay to “dead,” lifeless schemes, and thus to
“sink below the level of any meaning.”68
30 Routine habits are distinguished from creative ones on a qualitative scale, that is, they
are  understood  as  a  poor  instantiation  of  the  expressive  structure  of  habit,  where
expressiveness tends to the degree zero of meaning production. But the relation between
these two poles is still a dialectical one, since they are both manifestations of the same
expressive dynamic structure of habit formation and in this process can turn one into the
other. That’s also why the distinction between art and routine does not correspond to
that between impulse and habit – as if impulse were the creative element and habit the
mere routine. Although dialectically intertwined with the distinction between first and
second nature, the distinction between art and routine is not identical to it, since both
habits and impulses – which are in the end the dynamic aspect of habit – can manifest
themselves in various ways and play a role in the creative process of social life.
31 Life and Mechanism. But what does this expressivist dialectics of habit qua second nature
mean for critical social philosophy? In what follows I will argue that this expressivist
model plays an important role in Dewey’s analysis of currents of social thought in the
identification of  their  conceptual  strategies  and of  their  typical  fallacies,  and in  the
diagnosis of social pathologies of the modern world. In order to understand exactly the
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socio-philosophical meaning of this model, we first need to investigate at a deeper level
the distinction  between  routine  and  art  and  how  it  relates  to  the  question  of  the
automaticity of habits. As we saw, already Dewey’s early work gave an important role to
the fact that habit has to function as something automatic, embodied in preintentional
physiological mechanisms, and operates at a prereflexive, unconscious level. Whereas,
according  to  some interpreters,  the  young  Dewey  had  the  tendency  to  identify  this
automaticity with routine and to oppose it to skills,69 we have seen that already in the
early lectures on Spirit, and certainly in the mature systematization of Human Nature and
Conduct, Dewey goes beyond such a dualism and realizes that automatism is required for
both  routine  and  skills  to  function.  This  leads  Dewey  to  deeply  appreciate  the
indispensable  role  that  “mechanism”  plays  for  the  development  of  life’s  activities,
including social ones.
32 In Human Nature  and Conduct  this  leads Dewey to develop a strong criticism of  those
positions – one implicit target seems to be Bergson’s vitalism – that assume a dualism
between life and mechanism. Dewey states on the contrary that “all life operates through
a mechanism.” In this sense mechanism is “indispensable” for life and higher levels of
life’s  development  are  not  to  be  understood  as  merely  departing  from  mechanical
organization,  but  rather  as  evolving  into  more  complex  and  flexible  automatisms.70
Dewey refuses to identify mechanism with an “unintelligent automatism,” and thinks
that automatism applies both to unintelligent and intelligent activities. Hence the notion
of mechanism cuts cross the distinction between routine and art and lies at the core of
Dewey’s understanding of habit. The old Hegelian motif of “habit as mechanism of self-
feeling” is here being re-elaborated in a more encompassing model according to which, as
Dewey writes:
Yet  all  habit  involves  mechanization.  Habit  is  impossible  without  setting  up  a
mechanism of action, physiologically engrained, which operates “spontaneously,”
automatically, whenever the cue is given. But mechanization is not of necessity all
there is to habit.
33 The indispensability of mechanism for habit formation is here related to the idea that
habit, in order to function, needs first to have physiological correlates (“physiologically
engrained”). Secondly, it must be implemented in a functional mechanism that operates
automatically at a pre-intentional and subpersonal level (“automatically”). And thirdly, it
must be phenomenologically expressed in a pre-reflexive, “spontaneous” dimension. 
34 It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  passage  quoted  above  also  implicitly  broaches  an
important  distinction  between  “mechanism”  and  “mechanization.”  Whereas
“mechanism” is indispensable at all levels of life in general, and of habit formation in
particular, “mechanization,” according to Dewey, “is not of necessity all there is to habit.”
The point here is not to oppose again mechanism and intelligent life, but rather to make
room for a gradual and evolutionary distinction between qualitatively different forms of
mechanisms,  that  is  between  simpler  and  repetitive  ones  and  more  complex  and
adaptable mechanisms: un-flexible and flexible machines.71 As Dewey writes, “the higher
the form of life,  the more complex sure and flexible the mechanism.” Moreover, this
notion of “mechanism,” whereas compatible with a naturalist frame of research, does not
seem  to  be  a  mechanicist  one,  and  seems  to  go  beyond  the  opposition  between
mechanism and self-organization, mechanical and teleological structure, since it makes
space for the evolution of intelligent, purposive mechanisms.
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35 The distinction between routine habits and “intelligent, artistic habits” must then be read
in the light of the indispensability of mechanism for the organization of social life forms.
This has an important effect also on the role that the aesthetic model of “art” plays in this
context. As Dewey writes:
Nevertheless  the  difference  between  the  artist  and  the  mere  technician  is
unmistakable. The artist is a masterful technician. The technique or mechanism is
fused  with  thought  and  feeling.  The  “mechanical”  performer  permits  the
mechanism to dictate the performance. It is absurd to say that the latter exhibits
habit and the former not. We are confronted with two kinds of habit, intelligent
and routine. All life has its élan, but only the prevalence of dead habits deflects life
into mere élan.72
36 Whereas the mechanical element is here affirmed to be indispensable also for the creative
act of the artist, the latter, understood as “masterful technician,” is characterized not by
the absence of  mechanism,  but rather by its  expressive mastery.  Whereas in routine
automatisms the mechanism “dictates the performance,” in creative habits automatisms
are fused with thought and feeling and are characterized by a higher plasticity. Here the
creative element is not an additional one, injected from the outside, such as a spiritual
supplement,  but  rather  a  qualitative  upgrade  of  the  mechanism  itself,  a  deeper
embodiment  of  its  functioning.  The  creative  element  of  art,  that  which  introduces
“variety,  flexibility  and sensitiveness  to  disposition,”  is  here  related to  some sort  of
expressive  empowerment.  This  is  a  matter  of  what  is  named  “force,”  that  is  vital
expenditure  involving physical  expression,  that  for  Dewey is  at  different  degrees  an
element  of  all  the  manifestations  of  our  life  form,  and  that  through  habituation  is
deployed and given consistency in a structured form. Intelligent, creative habits are then
those patterns of behavior that happen to liberate life’s energies in a “constructive form,”
that is, that expressively expand life’s forces – where the expressive act “releases energy
and  focuses  and  tranquillizes  it”73 –  producing  new  meanings  and  leading  to  their
appreciative enhancement.
37 Here the expressive notion of habit and the notion of freedom come together. As we have
already seen, this notion of habit as an expressive skill had already been connected by
Dewey in his Lectures on Spirit with the notion of self-mastery, of being with one-self as its
most accomplished form: a form that already in Hegel’s  §410 of  the Encyclopedia was
outlined as exhibiting the content of freedom, that is the structure of being with oneself
in the other that is the core of the expressive notion of social freedom.74 In Human Nature
and  Conduct  we  can  appreciate  how  an  expressive  model  of  habit  formation  shapes
Dewey’s understanding of social freedom as expressive liberation and reshaping of life’s
energies which emancipates them from stagnation and oppression. That’s why Dewey
sharply criticized the opposition between “convention,” “habit” and “institutions” on the
one hand, and “art,” “impulse” and “freedom” on the other hand, while affirming that
the real problem is not convention in itself, but rather stupid and rigid convention. This
way  Dewey  makes  room for  a  habit-based  notion  of  embodied  and  institutionalized
freedom which expressively liberates impulses, reshaping them creatively and stabilizing
them in institutional form.75
38 Over-mechanization and reification. We can now come back to the diagnostic role of the
expressive notion of habit qua second nature. The notion of mechanism is here a turning
point as for the dialectical torsion of habit formation. The ambivalence manifests itself
here in the above mentioned tension between mechanism and mechanization and is
grounded in the dialectical core of what Dewey names in his 1932 Ethics the “mechanizing
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influence of habit.”76 Whereas mechanism is necessary for all forms of life, from simple
life  forms  to  more  complex  and  intelligent  ones,  mechanization  goes  wild  when  it
becomes a process where mechanism is dualistically opposed to life, and reduced to a
dead thing that rather than empowering life, blocks its processes and leads them to decay
to an inorganic level. I would label “over-mechanization” this dialectical inversion where
organic mechanization turns into inorganic mechanization. This is a process, affected by
a deep dualism between mind and body, spirit and instrument, life and mechanism, which
not  only  results  in  some  sort  of  conceptual  philosophical  pathologies  which  cause
intellectual  suffering  and  instability,  but  for  Dewey  is  deeply  connected  with  social
pathologies that affect  modern life.  Such pathologies are due to economic and social
patterns  which  are  dualistically  structured,  and  where,  as  Dewey  writes  while
commenting upon Veblen, “machine-workers, he thought, tend to become mechanized in
their habits of thought and thus to resemble the machines which they operate.”77 Here
this form of brute mechanization of habit, which tends to reduce living mechanisms to
inorganic  and  simple  machines,  is  clearly  the  model  on  which  the  process  of  the
reification of industrial labor is conceived by Dewey. Reification is here understood as the
decay  of  living  patterns  of  interaction to  mere  routine  habit  –  consisting  merely  of
“machine-like  repetition.”78 According  to  Dewey’s  diagnosis,  such  forms  of  social
pathologies are connected with forms of social power which profit from dualist schemes
of  the  mind/body,  life/mechanism relation,  using  them as  functional  means  for  the
establishment  and the  perpetuation  of  domination of  some social  groups  over  some
others.79 This phenomenon, labeled here as “monopoly of social power,” is analyzed by
Dewey  more  extensively  in  his  Lectures  in  China,  where  he  shows  how  the  habitual
patterns of some social groups become dominant in social life over other groups in a way
which establishes “patterns of dominance-subservience.”80 Thus they end up exercising a
sort of monopolizing activity over life’s forces, reducing them to something “unilateral,”
“rigid,” “fossilized”81 – which are exactly the same expression that will be used by authors
such as Lukács and Adorno to refer to commodification as reified second nature, a sphere
of  interpersonal  life  turned  into  a  dead  thing.82 Reification  is  thus  analyzed  as  a
deprivation  and  suppression  of  life’s  potentialities  by  the  establishment  of  routine
patterns of reified second nature that sustain the domination of some groups over some
others but that lead to a social pathology from which all parts somehow suffer, since such
a unilateral and mortifying block of life’s forces affects also the dominating groups’ life.83
 
IV. Benchmarks of Social Criticism
39 The ambivalent appeal to human nature in social sciences and political thought. We can now
better see how exactly the lexicon of second nature informs Dewey’s social diagnoses and
critical analyses of social theories and political thought. This is a question we can detect
not only in the writings of the early twenties such as Human Nature and Conduct and in the
Lectures in China, but also in some of his later works such as Freedom and Culture and the
articles Human Nature and Contrary to Human Nature. For Dewey the question of second
nature is a social theoretical one already because competing social and political theories,
as he argues in Freedom and Culture, tend to justify courses of action and political policies
by appealing to different understandings of words such as “nature” and “natural.” And
what differentiates such understandings of the meaning of naturalness consists exactly in
the  way  they  articulate  the  relation  between  “first”  and  “second  nature,”  “native,”
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“original”  and “acquired.”84 Here  Dewey underlines  not  only  the different  and often
opposing way such words are used in order to structure different political options within
political  struggle,  but  also the intrinsic ambivalence of  such notions and how this  is
reflected and mobilized in competing practical programs. Also in the article on Human
Nature he wrote for the Encyclopedia of  the Social  Sciences (1932),  Dewey is particularly
interested  in  how  the  difference  between  families  of  political  thought  such  as
conservatives, liberals, nationalists, internationalists, democrats, aristocrats and so on,
can be traced back to different takes on human nature, which are on the other hand
framed in relation to the purposes of  “practical social  movements” rather than with
scientific objectiveness.85 Dewey’s point is a subtle one and should not be misunderstood
as a merely relativistic one. He is not just saying that political interests and purposes of
some social groups shape our understanding of human nature. He is also claiming that
different social movements bring into light distinct aspects of human nature. Here the
dynamics  of  social  conflict  plays  a  practical  cognitive  role  by  disclosing  something
otherwise not accessible to our experience. According to Dewey “new social movements,”
that is social movements expressing interests previously not recognized in the public
sphere,  bring  into  light  factors  of  human nature  that  were  disfigured,  concealed  or
repressed by the discourse grammar shaped by dominant groups.86
40 By saying that there is a least one “incontrovertible fact in human nature,” that is the
variety of the uses of this notion and their correspondence to different practical uses,
Dewey is stressing first the contested character of the concept of human nature. Here
Dewey’s  philosophical  contribution consists  of  a  conceptual  analysis  of  the  principal
meanings in which nature is understood by different understandings of “human nature,”
that is 1) nature conceived as something “original” and “native” vs. nature as “acquired”
and derived; 2) internal (psychological) nature vs. external (physical and social) nature; 3)
nature as something wholly modifiable and moldable by external influences vs. nature as
something invariant; 4) human nature as an institutional fact (language, religion, law,
state) vs. human nature as based on (either native or acquired) individual potentials.
41 Dewey’s overall strategy does not consist here in adopting one or another definition, but
rather in revealing the underlying dualism between original and derived, subjective and
objective, internal and external, on which all these conceptions are based, and in showing
the dialectical inversion of such meanings. Here the dialectics of second nature is exactly
what sets in motion this process, since it shows, as we have seen, that which appears first
as native nature, manifest itself also as derived, and vice versa; that acquired nature, once
understood as wholly moldable,  ends up being more persistent than native impulses,
which in turn aren’t at all invariant and represent factors of change and deviation; that
habit  is  not  just  an  internal  element  but  embodies  objective  natural,  social  and
institutional  forces,  which  are  in  turn  incorporated  in  individual  dispositions  whose
deployment contributes to the reshaping of these same forces.
42 Arguments from Nature in Social Discourse. In Human Nature and Conduct and in the article
Contrary to Human Nature (1940) such an approach is developed into a critical analysis of
specific socio-philosophical arguments based on an understanding of human nature. In
particular Dewey analyzed three main arguments he considers somehow fallacious, that
is 1) arguments that something is contrary to human nature, 2) arguments from the fixity
of human nature, and 3) arguments from the complete malleability of human nature. The
first argument is often used by those who oppose social change – as, for instance, was the
case with many arguments against the abolition of slavery and the enfranchisement of
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women. But, as Dewey notes, social change is on the one hand always somehow against
human nature as it exists at a certain time – that is, against human nature if understood
as acquired habitual disposition; on the other hand, social change can be said to conform
to human nature, if  we consider the fact that the tendency to learn and acquire is a
component of our native biological stock. Here we can see how Dewey’s criticism appeals
dialectically both to the ambivalent use of the notion of nature to be detected in such an
argument, and to the objective ambivalence of our naturalness.
43 As for  arguments  from the fixity  of  human nature,  these  are  analyzed by Dewey as
instances of the arguments that something is against human nature, since the latter often
appeal to the fact that human nature cannot be changed and from there jump to the
conclusion that policies that would like to modify it would be destined to fail. Such an
argument is thus reconstructed as a model of conservative discursive strategies in social
thought. Here the appeal to fixity of human nature is based on an a priori framework
shaped by practical interests rather than on objective scientific facts or on experimental
research. From the point of view of experimental inquiry one should rather say, as argued
above in a Darwinian way, that our native biological stock involves openness to change
and variation, and that history is but “a record of changes in human habits.”87 And if
there were elements of our nature that are relatively constant – which so far we don’t
know – their assessment would be a matter of experimental research rather than of a
priori anthropological statements.
44 But arguments from fixity are rather persistent notwithstanding their discrepancy with
what we know. And here Dewey finds some lessons to be learned for progressive thinkers.
First, such arguments tend to be rationalizations of existing habits and of the prejudices,
one-sided interests and institutionalized power structures which they incorporate. But
secondly, and here more relevantly, arguments from fixity are so successful over history
not because there is an invariant native human nature, but because our derivate nature,
that is habits, has a strong grip on our minds and action. We now see how an argument
that is  supposed to be based on the immutable structure of original  nature,  ends up
having its real base grounded on the inertial moment of habits. This is what Dewey names
here the “confusion of  second or acquired nature with original  nature” as  that  which
substantiates arguments from fixity and could give them an appearance of cogency. 
45 As for arguments from the complete malleability of human nature, these are criticized by
Dewey on the basis of the same conceptual strategy. First, habits are genuine components
of  our nature – since we are biologically  disposed to acquire a  second nature – and
manifest  some traits  of  inertial  persistency that  go against  the idea of  the complete
modifiability of human nature by will, at least at a given time. Dewey is of the idea that
social  reformers  should learn a  lot  from this,  and that  many families of  progressive
thinking – from liberalism to utopian socialism – reveal themselves to be based on a
questionable  constructionist  anthropology.  They  conceive  dualistically  the  relation
between history and nature, understanding the first as something completely modifiable
at  will  and ending up having a  disembodied notion of  social  practices  as  something
abstracted  from  material  and  natural  processes.  But  this  is  no  more  than  the
complementary side of the conservative perspective that reifies naturalness as something
given and not modifiable.
46 Aversion to the Unfamiliar and the Genealogy from Habit of Social Prejudice. I would now like to
explore more closely how the notion of habit as second nature is the source that sets in
motion Dewey’s figures of social criticism. First, Dewey’s critical notion of second nature
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is the basis of his reconstruction of the genealogy of social prejudice. In Human Nature and
Conduct and in more detail in the article Racial Prejudice and Friction (1922), Dewey traces
back to the constitutive anthropological role of habit formation the origin of some social
bias that come before judgment and influence our reflection by leading us to produce
defective judgments. These biases spring from the fact that habits are so “deep set in our
natures”88 as to produce some sort of spontaneous, unconscious aversion and antipathy to
what  is  unfamiliar,  “new,”  “unusual,”  “strange,”  “foreign,”  “alien,”  that  is,  to  what
departs from the established habits in which we were brought up. Please note, against
possible  misunderstandings  of  this  point,  that  such  a  natural  and  anthropological
mechanism  does  not  yet  naturalize  prejudices,  since  the  determinate  content  of
prejudices  such  as  racial  ones,  is  created  and  determined  by  a  number  of  physical,
religious, and political factors which historically cluster around the aversive dialectics of
habit formation.
47 Here the commonplace saying that “habit is a second nature” is again quoted as for the
“literal  truth  it  contains,”  and  which  is  here  related  to  the  way  such  an  aversive
mechanism functions,  leading us unconsciously to feel  as  “unnatural  or supernatural
whatever departs from our established habits.”89 The confusion between original  and
acquired nature comes up again here not just as a fallacy of political thought, but rather
as a bias of our spontaneous and prereflexive way of thinking which can be revealed by
social critique through a reflective use of the critical notion of second nature.
48 Figures of Social Criticism and the Dialectics of Nature. But how is this second nature based
model of social criticism exercised and which are the figures of conceptual reification it
unveils? Which are the practices of critique of social forms which Dewey deploys and that
manifest different, even if interrelated, aspects of the exercise of our critical potentials? I
think we can distinguish analytically the following figures.
49 Critique  of  Normalization.  The first  practice  to  be  criticized  is  what  I  would  call
‘normalization’. What is criticized here is the identification of the standards of practices
with “what is normal and hence is right” (Freedom and Culture).90 This is a process where
habitual standards of practices are taken to be social norms which define what is normal
and what  is  not,  and hence prescribe  what  should be according to  such a  model  of
normality. This is what happens in the instinctive aversion of social groups for whatever
departs from established habits. This is mediated by the process of habituation, which
does not mean that habituation should be identified with it. What happens here is that
the standards supplied from our habits  are taken to be norms which define what  is
normal and which lead to understanding whatever is alien and strange as being abnormal
or  unnatural.  Such an instance of  habitual  patterns is  at  the  origins  of  many social
prejudices, including what manifests itself as racism, that is, racial prejudice towards the
stranger (Racial Prejudice and Friction).91 This is also what happens in sexist societies. Here
some customary standards which embody a pattern of dominance-subservience tend to
be tacitly accepted by those who are subjected to them as established facts, having a
normative meaning. This is what in his Lectures in China Dewey describes as the first phase
– “tacit acceptance of the status quo” – of social reforms understood as struggles for
recognition.92
50 Critique of Over-Naturalization. This form of normalization may additionally combine
with  some  sort  of  naturalization,  that  is,  with  the  fact  that  nature  is  taken  to  be
normative, or else that social standards are taken to be inherent in the nature of things as
their natural norms.93 In this sense in sexist societies women not only tend to tacitly and
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acquiescently  accept  their  subordination,  but  are  additionally  led  to  see  their
subordination as  an “inalterable” natural  fact.94 The problem here is  not  merely the
naturalization of social standards. In some sense, as we have seen, social standards are
always  immanent  to  the  development  of natural  human  life  and  are  constantly
naturalized by the process of habit formation. There is nothing wrong in the fact that
habits come to be deeply engrained in our nature. The problem is much more in the way
such  a  naturalization  takes  place  in  some  instances  and  is  combined  with  certain
conceptions of naturalness. This reifying naturalization or over-naturalization is what
happens when naturalization is combined with normative normalization. Here the fact
that nature is taken to be normative means that it is understood to be as an original,
invariant, immutable, fixed norm. This is what Dewey names the “confusion of second or
acquired  nature  with  original  nature”95 and  Adorno  understood  as  an  instance  of
“identity  thinking.”  And the  critique of  reifying naturalization is  not  just  a  form of
denaturalization, since,  on the one hand, it  does not consist in saying that what was
supposed  to  be  natural  is  merely  artificial,  conventional,  historically  constructed;
moreover, such a critique has one of its sources in naturalness itself and its dialectic
movement.
51 Critique of  Essentialization.  In  this  sense,  the  problem here  is  what  might  be  called
essentialization: that is, the fact that standards are taken to be essential, original norms,
that is,  norms which define the invariant essence of something. That’s why a further
practice of social criticism can be exercised as critique of essentialization.  In some cases
what is essentialized is precisely naturalness. But naturalness, as we have seen, is not the
same as invariance, and in this sense the criticism of essentialization is a form of criticism
which  may  be  performed  from  within  nature,  that  is,  deploying  the  polysemy  of
naturalness against the unilateral and reifying tendency to identify it with invariance.
This  corresponds  to  the second phase  of  social  reform,  as  Dewey describes  it  in  his
Lectures in China, that is, “challenge”: a phase where “facts of nature” turn out not to be
immutable after all, that is, where their invariance is revealed by criticism, to use the
words  of  Adorno,  as  an  appearance  of  necessity,  something  which  conceals  the
contingency and transience of those very facts.96
52 Critique of Alienation. A further practice of social criticism consists in the critique of the
“alienation” of social life. This is what the criticism of bad habits amounts to. Habits are
criticized not as such, neither because they assume the form of a second nature – that is,
are constantly re-naturalized – but rather insofar as they assume a rigid, lifeless, dead
form.  That  is,  insofar  as  their  naturalness  loses  its  living,  organic  and  expressive
character and becomes something dead, crystallized, decaying to inorganic naturalness.
Alienation  is  here  understood  as  an  “antonym  of  associated  living,”97 that  is,  as
devitalization, deprivement of its natural expressive force, of its energy. And the previous
figures of  practices  of  social  critique are somehow encompassed by this  latter,  since
normalization,  overnaturalization  and  essentialization  can  be  understood  as  specific
mechanisms through which life is alienated. The qualitative enhancement of associated
living is understood by Dewey in his Lectures in China as extended communication. Then
social alienation – which Dewey exemplifies with rigidly stratified authoritarian societies
such as the caste system in India, clerical religions, societies divided into uncultivated
masses and social elites – is understood as a lack of communication between social groups
where  this  is  limited  or  impeded  by  a  socially  established  blockage.  Alienation is
connected with reactive feelings such as dissatisfaction, dislike, aversion to otherness,
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hatred, and deprivation, in those who are subjected to them. Moreover, alienation leads
to the inhibition and atrophy of individual and collective capacities, and can lead to forms
of introversion which can take two complementary forms, that is, on the one hand social
acquiescence and servility, on the other hand, cunning and deceitfulness (an analysis of
social  alienation  which  seems  to  be  following  the  model  exposed  by  Hegel  in  the
Phenomenology of Spirit in his analysis of the Neveau de Rameau as estranged consciousness).
53 First and Second Nature as Benchmarks of Social Criticism. All the above mentioned figures of
social criticism – critique of normalization, critique of over-naturalization, critique of
essentialization, and critique of alienation – are understood as manifestations of a wider
critical dispositive, that is, the dialectics of first and second nature, or else, the dialectics
of impulse and habit. Habit, as we have seen, is acquired, is a secondary formation which
is the result of the social shaping of impulses, but is nevertheless a manifestation of our
organic natural way of living, since it is necessary for our life form to reproduce itself
through habituation. In this sense habit is a second nature. But habit is also nature
because, even if secondary, it is as potent and urgent as first nature. Such a distinction
between first and second nature is then a contextual and positional one and should not be
absolutized. I think we can find here a sort of criticism ante litteram of those positions
that, such as bald naturalism on the one side, and McDowell’s quietism on the other, tend
to  absolutize  the  distinction  between  first  and  second  nature  and  choose  to  place
themselves exclusively on one side (whereas bald naturalism stays on the side of first
nature, McDowell chooses to stay only on the side of second nature).98
54 When the distinction is absolutized, this leads to forms of essentialization which have an
alienating character. It is, as Dewey writes in his article on Human Nature, as if we took a
“static cross section,” a “snapshot of man,” ignoring the dynamic process of his growth.99
That’s  what  happens  for  instance  when  nature  is  taken  to  be  normative  and  such
normativity is essentialized as invariance. This may affect both our understanding of first
and  of  second  nature.  So,  for  instance,  conservatism  (and  bald  naturalism)  tend  to
identify  first  nature  –  instinct,  impulse  –  with  something  invariant,  whereas  radical
historicism tends to think of second nature as being completely malleable. But if we do
not absolutize the distinction between first and second nature,  we may discover that
what appears as first nature, as for instance impulse, is rather undetermined, readily
modifiable,  and  shapeable  by  already  given  habits;  moreover,  native  activities  are
secondary in the course of conduct, since they acquire their meaning in function of given
habitual patterns. Hence the first naturalness of impulse may turn into second nature.
Whereas  what  appears  as  second  nature,  for  instance,  habit,  is  often,  even  if  not
essentially, rather persistent and manifests a greater inertia; moreover, habit is primary
in the course of conduct, since it is in its function that native activities acquire social
meaning. Hence the second naturalness of habit may turn into first nature.100 
55 In this sense the distinction between first and second nature is not always a given thing,
but manifests itself anew in relation to the changing social and historical contexts of life’s
development. Neither should we assume that the concepts of first and second nature
describe two metaphysically given and separate domains of objects.101 First and second
nature are rather dialectically intertwined place-holder concepts, to be filled in relation
to different contexts and which disclose certain configurations of experience and action.
This does not mean that such a distinction cannot be useful and justified under some
circumstances.  This  is  a  point  Dewey makes  when he argues  that  such a  distinction
between  first  and  second,  native  and  acquired  nature  is  a  “convenient  intellectual
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device,”  a  “bench mark  useful  for  studying  some particular  period  of  development”
which has  descriptive  power  and is  practically  important  since  it  can disclose  to  us
configurations of experience not otherwise accessible.102 In fact, in biological and social
arrangements there is always something which is given and something which has to be
acquired under this basis. And if we want to modify and transform human nature and
social life, we have to take this into account and depart from here. Hence, the distinction
between first and second nature is a dynamic and dialectic one and always needs to be re-
described anew in relation to the context we need to map and operate within. Its dialectic
character means that such a distinction not only has a certain descriptive power, but also
a critical power, since it describes the process of critical transformation of associated life.
Hence the distinction between first and second nature is a critical dispositive, which is
needed to deploy the practices of social criticism we have sketched out: such a distinction
is the perspective from which, from time to time, we can critically re-describe processes
of associated life, criticizing the ongoing normative essentialization of its shape and the
consequent alienation which results from it.
56 Nature as a Source of Criticism. The intimate dialectics of first and second nature is finally
rooted in the polisemy of naturalness and in the ambivalence of its social manifestation,
as it is manifest in the ambivalence of the process of habit formation and its performative
oscillation between enslavement and liberation, repetition and creativity,  routine and
art,  inertial  tendency and unexpected development.  On the one hand, some forms of
essentializing  naturalization  lead  to  social  subjugation.  But  on  the  other  hand,
naturalness  –  as  for  instance  it  is  manifest  in  the role  that  native  impulses  play  in
education and in social life, and in the role that reflexivity, as naturally grounded, plays
in  moral  and  social  thought103 –  can  be an  agent  of  deviation,  transformation,
revitalization, and reconstruction of social practices. Naturalness can then be a source of
the liberation of  social  life and of  the enhancement of  individual  and shared human
capacities. 
57 The intimate dialectics of first and second nature manifest also the ultimate dynamic
character  of  naturalness,  the  way  in  which  it  constantly  transforms  itself  –  either
decaying, or falling into pieces, or evolving. This, according to what Dewey wrote already
in his article on The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy (1909), is not only the lesson of
social criticism but also of Darwinism, understood as a revolt against a philosophy that
endorses the primacy of that which is immutable and fixed – of nature as origin – and in
this  respect  contributes  to  the  rethinking of  a  new philosophy of  nature  capable  of
turning  from  the  “permanent  to  the  changeable”:  to  the  rethinking  of  nature  as
something temporary and contingent, relatively stable and relatively changeable.104 That
which the young Adorno named the “transient” character of nature, and which manifests
the  internal  connection  between  first  and  second  nature,  nature  and  history  –  the
intimate tendency of  history to decay to naturalness,  and the tendency of  nature to
develop historically105 which is expressed in the dialectics of habit formation.
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NOTES
1. See for instance EW 4: 241, MW 5: 309-11, MW 13: 243-344, and LW 13: 308.
2. See LW 13: 68, EW4: 356-7, and LW14: 258-9.
3. Dewey (2010: 130-1).
4. Cfr. Enz § 410A: 141.
5. MW 14: 88.
6. MW 14: 31.
7. LW 2: 334-5.
8. LW 2: 335: “The influence of habit is decisive because all distinctively human action has to be
learned, and the very heart, blood, and sinews of learning is creation of habitudes.”
9. MW 14: 38: “habits incorporate an environment within themselves. They are adjustments of
the environment, not merely to it.”
10. See Dewey (1973: 85, and MW 14: 85).
11. See Testa 2008.
12. See MW 14: 43.
13. Enz § 410A; and Wallace/Miller: 132.
14. On the idea that Hegel’s naturalism turns around his reading of habit, and for a criticism in
this light of constructivist interpretations such as Robert Pippin’s and Terry Pinkard’s, see Testa
2012 and 2012a, and Levine 2015, who characterizes Dewey as a “left-hegelian naturalist.”
15. See Enz § 410A; and Wallace/Miller: 132: “Habit is a form that embraces all kinds and stages
of mind’s activity. The most external of them, the individual spatial determination, his upright
stance, is made by will into his habit, an immediate, unconscious posture which always remains a
matter of his continuing will.” 
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16. “Habit  means  special  sensitiveness  or  accessibility  to  certain  classes  of  stimuli,  standing
predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrences of specific acts. It means will” (MW 14:
32).
17. RPh § 151.
18. MW  14:  65.  See also MW 14:  86:  “it  exemplifies again our leading proposition that social
customs  are  not  direct  and  necessary  consequences  of  specific  impulses,  but  that  social
institutions and expectations shape and crystallize impulses into dominant habits.”
19. MW 14: 67 and 76.
20. “For any activity is original when it first occurs. As conditions are continually changing, new
and primitive activities are continually occurring” (MW 14: 108).
21. MW 14: 10-1.
22. See Testa 2017.
23. “Human beings even die as a result of habit – that is, if they have become totally habituated
to  life  and  mentally  [geistig]  and  physically  blunted,  and  the  opposition  between  subjective
consciousness and mental activity has disappeared. For they are active only in so far as they have
not yet attained something and wish to assert themselves and show what they can do in pursuit
of it.  Once this is accomplished, their activity and vitality disappear,  and the loss of interest
which ensues is mental or physical death” (RPh 151A). Note that that total habituation would
correspond to a situation, in Dewey’s terms, where impulses are completely exhausted by formed
habits, that is, where all habits would be “dead habits.” Hence, the distinction between “living”
and “dead habits” which Dewey often traces (see for instance MW 14: 51-2), articulates exactly
the point Hegel made in the Grundlinien.
24. Arvi Särkelä (2017) has to my mind usefully emphasized the important role that the notion of
“stagnation” plays here to characterize the situation where habits block life’s forces and lead
them to decay into inorganic, lifeless nature.
25. “If  we  employ  the  conception  of  historic relativity,  nothing  is  clearer  than  that  the
conception of liberty is always relative to forces that at a given time and place are increasingly
felt  to  be  oppressive.  Liberty  in  the  concrete  signifies  release  from the  impact  of  particular
oppressive forces; emancipation from something once taken as a normal part of human life but
now experienced as bondage” (LW 11: 34). On the notion of freedom as liberation in relation to
Hegel (Befreiung) see Menke 2010, and Testa 2015.
26. “There would be no chance of learning a new factor mastering a new action, were it not that
the automatic  action of  habit  takes care of  all  old and familiar  experiences,  and thus leaves
conscious and purposive action free” (EW 2: 103). See Hegel’s passage: “the soul is free of them,
insofar as it is not interested in or occupied with them; while it exists in these formations as its
possessions, it is at the same time open to other activities and occupations” (Enz § 410A).
27. See Dewey (2010: 130). 
“The unfreedom in habit is partly just formal, pertaining only to the being of the soul; partly only
relative, in so far as it really arises only in the case of bad habits, or in so far as a habit is opposed
by another purpose; the habit of right in general, of the ethical, has the content of freedom. The
essential determination is the liberation from sensations that man gains through habit, when he is
affected by them” (Enz § 410A; Wallace/Miller 131).
28. Enz § 410Z; Wallace/Miller 134. For an interesting analysis of the dialectical relation between
‘productive’ and ‘repressive’ sides of the “Macht der Gewöhnheit” see Ranchio (2016: 217-29).
29. Enz § 410Z; Wallace/Miller: 131.
30. Enz § 410 A; Wallace/Miller: 131.
31. Enz § 410A; Wallace/Miller: 131.
32. Enz § 410A; Wallace/Miller: 132.
33. Enz § 410Z; Wallace/Miller: 136.
34. Enz § 411Z; Wallace/Miller: 139.
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35. EW4: 24.
36. MW5: 309-11.
37. LW13: 108; see also LW2: 336-7.
38. LW13: 96.
39. LW13: 68.
40. RPh: § 151.
41. Rph: § 146.
42. LW 17: 259.
43. LW17: 258.
44. MW6: 229.
45. LW2: 336.
46. LW13: 108.
47. MW13: 43.
48. MW5: 58.
49. See MW5: 310.
50. EW4: 356-7.
51. MW5: 209.
52. MW 6: 229.
53. LW 2: 336-7.
54. LW14: 258.
55. LW6: 32.
56. “Habits as organized activities are secondary and acquired, not native and original. They are
outgrowths of unlearned activities which are part of man's endowment at birth” (MW 14: 65).
57. See MW 14: 65.
58. Enz § 410Z; Wallace/Miller 136.
59. Dewey (2010: 130).
60. On  some historical  aspects  of  the  aesthetic  model  of  second  nature  in  German classical
philosophy, see Kuhrana 2016.
61. See Ryle (2009: 28), and Lukács 1971.
62. Please note that also Hegel refers to the fact that in the common sense and the philosophical
tradition  “habit  is  often  spoken  of  disparagingly  and  taken  to  be  a  lifeless,  contingent  and
particular thing” (Enz §410A; Wallace/Miller 133). Hence, Hegel himself does not identify habit
with lifeless repetition, and in principle makes room for a distinction between expressively poor
and expressively rich manifestations of habit.
63. MW 14: 32.
64. MW 14: 48.
65. See MW 14: 48.
66. MW 14: 146.
67. MW 14: 74.
68. MW 14: 146.
69. See Hartmann (2003: 157).
70. MW 14: 51: “All life operates through a mechanism, and the higher the form of life the more
complex, sure and flexible the mechanism. This fact alone should save us from opposing life and
mechanism,  thereby  reducing  the  latter  to  unintelligent  automatism  and  the  former  to  an
aimless splurge.”
71. On the relation of the notion of mechanism to Dewey’s notion of instrument see Renault 2017.
72. MW 14: 51.
73. MW 14: 113.
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74. See Enz §410Z, Wallace/Miller 134: “This being-together-with-one’s-own-self we call habit. In
habit the soul […] has made itself so at home in the content, that it moves about in it with freedom
.”
75. See MW 14: 115. 
76. LW 7: 381.
77. LW 7: 379.
78. MW 14: 126.
79. See MW 14: 52.
80. Dewey (1973: 92).
81. Dewey (2015: 19). 
82. See Lukács (1971: 140-156), and Adorno (1973: 356-7).
83. See on this Testa 2017a.
84. LW 13: 108.
85. LW 6: 39.
86. LW 6: 39: “A new social movement brings into play factors in human nature which were
hitherto dormant or concealed; in thus evoking them into action it also presents them to the
notice of organized thought.”
87. LW 14: 259.
88. MW 13: 243.
89. MW 13: 243-4.
90. LW 13: 108.
91. MW 13: 243-8.
92. Dewey (1973: 77).
93. MW 13: 243-8.
94. Dewey (1973: 77).  For an interesting reading of this aspect of sexist naturalization in the
context of a critical approach to the dualism between nature and society in feminist discourse,
see Gregoratto 2017.
95. LW 14: 258-9.
96. Dewey (1973: 77).
97. Dewey (1973: 91).
98. For a critical comparison between McDowell and some aspects of Dewey’s philosophy, see
Welchman  2008,  and  Godfrey-Smith  2010.  Both  authors  argue  that  Dewey  would  resist
McDowell’s  idea  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  engage  in  constructivist  or  bridging  philosophical
projects of locating features of second nature in first nature or in the world as conceived by
natural science. This diagnosis, although a correct one, concerns only the epistemological aspects
of Dewey’s philosophy and does not address its socio-philosophical side. Moreover, it does not
offer a reconstruction of the notion of “second nature” by Dewey, which is to my mind also
needed in order to better appreciate his relation to McDowell’s project.
99. LW 6: 31.
100. MW 5: 309-11.
101. See on this also Schmidd Noerr 1997.
102. LW 6: 32.
103. LW 1: 62: “A naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider reflection as itself a natural event
occurring within nature because of traits of the latter.”
104. MW 4: 3-15.
105. See Adorno (1997: 345-5).
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ABSTRACTS
Dewey’s  notion  of  second  nature  is  strictly  connected  with  that  of  habit.  I  reconstruct  the
Hegelian heritage of this model and argue that habit qua second nature is understood by Dewey
as a something which encompasses both the subjective and the objective dimension – individual
dispositions and features of the objective natural and social environment. Secondly, the notion of
habit qua second nature is used by Dewey both in a descriptive and in a critical sense and is as
such a  dialectical  concept  which connects  “impulse”  and “habit,”  “original”  or  “native”  and
“acquired” nature, “first” and “second nature.” Thirdly, the ethical model of second nature as
habituation and the aesthetic model of second nature as art are for Dewey not opposed to one
another, since by distinguishing “routine” and “art” as two modes of habit, he makes space for an
expressive and creative notion of second nature. Finally, I argue that the expressive dialectics of
habit formation plays a crucial role in Dewey’s critical social philosophy and that first and second
nature operate as benchmark concepts for his diagnosis of social pathologies.
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